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Flight initiation distance (FID), the distance at which an organism
flees from an approaching threat, is an ecological metric of cost–
benefit functions of escape decisions. We adapted the FID paradigm
to investigate how fast- or slow-attacking “virtual predators” con-
strain escape decisions. We show that rapid escape decisions rely on
“reactive fear” circuits in the periaqueductal gray and midcingulate
cortex (MCC), while protracted escape decisions, defined by larger
buffer zones, were associated with “cognitive fear” circuits, which
include posterior cingulate cortex, hippocampus, and the ventrome-
dial prefrontal cortex, circuits implicated in more complex informa-
tion processing, cognitive avoidance strategies, and behavioral
flexibility. Using a Bayesian decision-making model, we further
show that optimization of escape decisions under rapid flight
were localized to the MCC, a region involved in adaptive motor
control, while the hippocampus is implicated in optimizing deci-
sions that update and control slower escape initiation. These re-
sults demonstrate an unexplored link between defensive survival
circuits and their role in adaptive escape decisions.
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Survival depends on the adaptive capacity to balance fitness-promoting behaviors, such as copulation and foraging, with
the omnipresent risk of lethal predatory attack (1, 2). In the field
of behavioral ecology, this balance between survival behaviors is
depicted by economic models of flight initiation distance (FID),
which capture risk functions by measuring the distance at which
an organism flees from an approaching threat, while considering
the cost of fleeing (1, 3, 4). A wealth of ethological literature
demonstrates that prey are remarkably adept at escape and make
decisions based on the predator’s directionality, lethality, velocity,
and previous experience with the predator (5). In addition to its
capacity to measure escape decisions, FID is a well-established
index of threat sensitivity, resulting in large variability within and
between species (5). Despite FID measures being applied to a
large variety of taxa, this reliable measure has not been used to
identify heterogeneity in threat sensitivity or escape decisions in
humans, and the neural circuits remain unexplored.
Theoretical and neuroanatomical models support the existence
of an interconnected defensive survival circuitry that is remarkably
preserved across species (2, 6–9). Under the conditions of imme-
diate danger, the “reactive fear” circuitry is evoked. This circuitry
includes the midbrain periaqueductal gray (PAG), central amyg-
dala (CeA), hypothalamus, and the midcingulate cortex (MCC),
which relay, update, and initiate essentially innate reactions in-
cluding flight and freezing (7, 10–14). Conversely, the ventromedial
prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), hip-
pocampus, and basolateral amygdala form a collective set of re-
gions that constitutes the “cognitive fear” circuitry that promotes
more complex information processing involved in behavioral flex-
ibility, internal risk assessment, and cognitive avoidance strategies
(2, 15–17). Although few behavioral ecologists have considered the
neurophysiology underlying escape decisions, some have proposed
similar dichotomies suggesting that fast, but inaccurate, decisions
are processed by subcortical regions, while slow, but accurate, de-
cisions are processed by cortical system (18, 19). Under natural
conditions, both cognitive- and reactive-fear circuits work in har-
mony by adaptively switching between survival circuits to engage
the most optimal strategy to maximize escape (2, 13, 17, 20).
Excitation and inhibition between these circuits is determined
by the spatiotemporal distance to the threat (9, 13, 15, 21). For
example, distant threat often results in freezing and threat as-
sessment, yet when the threat is close, active flight will be observed
(9). Distance to the threat, therefore, is crucial in choosing the
best escape strategy. Evidence suggests that this pattern is con-
served across various species. In humans, active escape tasks have
been used, where the goal of the subject is to escape from a virtual
looming threat with the capacity to chase, capture, and shock the
subject in a virtual maze. Functional MRI (fMRI) results show
that when a threat is distant, there is increased activity in the
vmPFC, PCC, and basolateral nucleus of the amygdala. Conversely,
as the threat moves closer, there is a switch to increased activity in
the CeA and PAG (19, 22, 23). However, these, and related studies,
have failed to investigate the neural basis of escape decisions
(i.e., flight initiation) or examination the computational mecha-
nisms that underlie escape decisions to changing attack distances.
We developed a paradigm to investigate how the defensive
survival circuitry facilitates escape decisions when subjects en-
counter fast- or slow-attacking threats (Fig. 1A). In this task,
participants encountered virtual predators of three colors, each
representing different attack distances (ADs). On each trial, the
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actual AD was drawn from a Gaussian distribution that was
unique to the particular predator type. Fast-attacking predators
(i.e., predators that attack from a larger distance) were charac-
terized by the virtual predator quickly switching from slow ap-
proach to fast attack velocity, therefore requiring the subject to
make quick escape decisions. On the other hand, slow-attacking
predators (i.e., predators that attack from a smaller distance)
slowly approached for longer time periods, resulting in larger
buffer zones leading to more time to strategize escape. All types
of predator loomed and sped up at the same rate, and only
differed in their timing of attack.
The goal of the task was to escape from the predator while, at
the same time, attempting to acquire as much money as possible
by fleeing as late as possible (Fig. 1B). Using this task, we pro-
posed several hypotheses: (i) for fast escape decisions, we expect
to see activity in the reactive fear circuitry, while slow escape
decisions will reveal more pronounced activity in the cognitive
fear circuitry. In addition, (ii) using a Bayesian decision-making
model where subjects’ preference to reward and avoidance to
punishment are considered, we predict that the reactive and
cognitive fear circuits will play a corresponding role in facilitating
fast and slow escape decisions, respectively.
Results
Behavior. We first examined the behavioral data by applying a
repeated-measures, three-way ANOVA (predator type by re-
ward level by shock level) for escape responses (e.g., FIDs).
Results showed a main effect of predator type [F(2,54) = 82.59,
P < 0.001]. Post hoc comparisons for the predator type by shock
level interaction revealed that the difference in FID choices
between high and low shock levels exists only in the slow-
attacking predator condition (P = 0.013). This shows that sub-
jects took the level of potential danger into consideration while
choosing FID (more risk-averse when shock is higher), but only
in the slow-attacking threat where there was time for strategic
avoidance. The same repeated-measures three-way ANOVA was
performed for escape difficulty ratings. A main effect of predator
type was found [F(2,54) = 49.77, P < 0.001], showing that subjects
estimate fast-attacking predator as the most difficult predator
type to escape (all post hoc comparisons: P < 0.001). Significant
interactions were found for predator type by shock level [F(2,54) =
13.68; P < 0.001] and predator type by reward level [F(2,54) =
4.39; P = 0.017]. For the predator type by shock level interaction,
we found that rating was higher in the high shock condition, but
only in the slow-attacking predator (post hoc comparison:
Fig. 1. Experimental procedures, Ydenberg and Dill model (1), and distribution of escape decisions. (A) Subjects are told whether their decisions will result in
high or low reward or shock. They are then presented with the image of the virtual predator where the color signals the attack distance (2 s) (e.g., blue, fast;
red, slow). After a short interval, the virtual predator appears at the end of the runway and slowly moves toward the subject’s triangle. After an unspecified
amount of time (e.g., 4–10 s), the artificial predator will attack the subject’s virtual triangle exit (i.e., attack distance). To escape, the subject must flee before
the predator attacks. If the subject is caught, they will receive a tolerable, yet aversive, shock to the back of the hand. Trials end when the predator reaches
the subject or the exit. To motivate longer fleeing time, the task will include an economic manipulation, where subjects will obtain more money the longer
they stay in the starting position and lose money the earlier they enter the safety exit. After each trial, the subject is asked to report how difficult they found
it to escape the virtual predator (4 s). (B) Modified schematic representation from the model proposed by Ydenberg and Dill (3). As the distance between the
prey and the predator decreases, the cost of fleeing decays, while the cost of not fleeing rises. D* represents an optimal point where the prey should flee.
(C) Histograms showing the distribution of subjects’ flight initiation decision (FID) choices for early-, mid-, and late-attacking predators, respectively. The x axis
represents FID, while the y axis represents frequency of choice.
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P < 0.001). This is intriguing because the predator’s attack dis-
tance is identical at both shock levels, yet subjects perceived the
threat to be more difficult to escape in the high-shock condition
(SI Appendix, Fig. S1).
Neural Basis of Fast and Slow Escape Decisions.We next investigated
the neural basis of the escape decisions for the fast- and slow-
attacking threats. To control for timing differences between
conditions, besides modeling the rest of the trial as a boxcar
function, we specifically looked at the 2 s before the FID button
press as a period where subjects form their final decisions. We
chose to time lock 2 s before the flight initiation decision for
several reasons: (i) it allowed us to examine the neural ramping
up of the flight initiation, (ii) it controlled for the contamination
of outcome, and (iii) it reduced the amount or trials that would
be lost for the fast-attacking condition. Also, to control for any
confounds of pain, we excluded the caught trials (number of
caught trials: fast-attacking predator, mean, 8 ± 3; mid-attacking
predator, mean, 5 ± 2; slow-attacking predator, mean = 4 ± 1),
using these events as regressors of no interest. As the mid-
attacking condition was a priori used an anchor for the fast-
and slow-attacking threats, we focus on activity for the fast and
slow attacking. A whole-brain analysis was first performed to
locate regions associated with decisions under reactive fear (fast-
attacking predators) and cognitive fear (slow-attacking preda-
tors). Detailed regions of activation can be found in SI Appendix,
Tables S1 and S2. As shown in Fig. 2, data extracted from a
priori and independent anatomical regions of interest (ROIs) of
PAG, MCC, PCC, hippocampus, and vmPFC, were differentially
activated for the different predator conditions.
To confirm the dissociation between the reactive and cognitive
fear systems (represented by PAG and vmPFC, respectively), we
computed a two-way ANOVA (region by predator type) using
signal change drawn from independent ROIs from PAG and
vmPFC. There was a main effect of region (F = 5.77, P = 0.017)
and a significant interaction between region and predator type (F =
11.50, P < 0.001). For the [fast-attacking predator > control] con-
trast, we observed increased activity in PAG and MCC. A direct
comparison between high and low shock levels for the fast-attacking
predator revealed increased activity in the PAG, suggesting that
PAG is evoked when the threat is high (SI Appendix, Table S7).
On the other hand, the [slow-attacking predator > control]
contrast revealed increased activity in the cognitive fear circuitry
including the vmPFC, PCC, and the hippocampus. While no
amygdala was observed for the main contrast, a direct comparison
between high and low shock levels in the slow-attacking predator
condition showed increased activity in the amygdala and hippo-
campus (SI Appendix, Table S8). To further disentangle the effect
and increase the sensitivity of the analysis, we extracted the signal
changes and BOLD-signal time series from the predefined ROIs
(i.e., PAG, MCC, vmPFC, PCC, and hippocampus), regions that
have previously been associated with fear, anxiety, and decision
making under stress (22). A conjunction between fast- and slow-
attacking threats showed that the medial dorsal thalamus (MDT)
was commonly activated. Although this is an exploratory finding, it
is intriguing because MDT is directly or indirectly connected to
both fear circuits, since stimulation of the MDT results in de-
pression or potentiation of both circuits and it is thought to play a
role in behavioral flexibility (24, 25).
Computations That Support Escape Decisions. To explore how the
observed FIDs might be understood in terms of rational decision
making (i.e., the costs and benefits of flight), we developed a
Bayesian decision-making model. The process by which subjects
make escape choices under different predator ADs can be
decomposed to two steps: (i) predicting predators’ distribution of
attack distances, by learning from experience; and (ii) choosing
an FID by comparing the money that can be possibly obtained
against the potential risk of shock for each possible FID, in ex-
pectation over the predicted attack distance distribution and
informed by the individual’s subjective preference levels for
shock vs. money. We assume a Bayesian ideal observer model of
subjects’ learning to estimate the attack distances of different
predators from trial-by-trial experience. FID choices are then
determined (with softmax noise) by computing the expected
utility for each possible escape distance. We then calculated the
distance between utility resulted from subjects’ actual FID and
the predicted Bayes ideal FID, which is considered a measure of
optimal performance. The modeling results are shown in Fig. 3
and SI Appendix, Figs. S3 and S4. Details of the model are
explained in SI Appendix, SI Text.
We next examined the neural circuits that correlated with each
subjects’ preference parameters in the Bayesian decision model.
For a rational player, the preference for reward should be pos-
itive, while the preference for shock should be negative. Thus,
greater reward or shock sensitivity here corresponds to larger
(positive) β2 and smaller (negative) β1 amplitudes. The para-
metric modulation analysis over the [predator > control] con-
trasts revealed that, for the fast-attacking predator condition,
higher reward sensitivity was associated with activations in
)
Fig. 2. Main regions of interest and signal changes
associated with fast- and slower-attacking threats.
Parameter estimates and time series extracted from
(A) midbrain, (B) MCC, (C) vmPFC, (D) PCC, and (E)
the hippocampus. Activations shown in the graph
show clusters from the whole-brain activation, while
the signal change data were extracted from in-
dependent anatomical ROIs. The Upper graph dis-
plays parameter estimates. The y axis represents
percent signal changes, and the x axis is the predator
type. The Lower graph display time series extracted
in a course of 16 s. Blue line: fast predator; red line:
slow predator. The beginning of the time series
represents the time point when the FID event comes
online.
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bilateral putamen, while higher shock sensitivity is associated
with engagement in PAG and bilateral insula. On the other
hand, for the slow-attacking predator condition, right caudate
was found to be associated with higher reward sensitivity, while
PCC was found to be associated with higher shock sensitivity. A
display of the activated regions can be found in SI Appendix, Fig.
S3. A detailed layout of the activated regions can be found in SI
Appendix, Tables S9 and S10.
Next, to investigate what neural circuits are responsible for the
optimization of escape decisions, we considered a measure of
performance optimality related to the per-trial spread between
subjects’ actual and Bayesian ideal FIDs. In particular, we com-
puted the difference between the actual trial-specific utility
UðFIDÞ and the maximum (Bayes optimal) utility the subject
could possibly get on the trial [UðFIDÞmax], given their estimated
subjective utilities. A smaller difference (e.g., less regret relative to
ideal) implies more consistent Bayesian decision making; variation
around the ideal FID will increase the difference. The differences
on every trial were entered as a subject-level parametric modu-
lator separately under each [predator > control] conditions. For
the fast-attacking predator condition, we found that better
Bayesian decisions (smaller distance to ideal) was associated
with activity in MCC, middle frontal gyrus, and superior motor
cortex. On the other hand, better Bayesian decision making in
the slow-attacking predator condition was found to be associated
with activity in bilateral hippocampus, as shown in Fig. 4.
Functional Connectivity Between Computationally Defined Regions.
To investigate the interplay among the brain regions involved in
escape decision optimization, a functional connectivity analysis
was performed for the response phase (escape decision) using a
generalized psychophysiological interactions approach (26); to
confirm the patterns observed in the whole-brain flexible model,
we first adopted independent seed regions of MCC and hippo-
campus from previous research (19). For the contrast of [fast-
attacking predator > control], we showed a significant coupling
between the MCC seed, the PAG, motor cortex, and bilateral
thalamus. For the contrast of slow predator > control, we
showed a significant coupling between the hippocampus seed
and PCC. This suggests that, when the subjects are provided time
for decision flexibility, they use a search-and-employ approach
that prepares them for action, as shown in Fig. 4.
Discussion
We have demonstrated that subjects apply different nodes of the
survival circuitry when escaping fast- and slow-attacking threats.
Our analysis revealed increased activity in reactive-fear circuits,
namely the PAG and the MCC for the fast attacking predator,
regions that are implicated in motor response to fast and immi-
nent threats. Supporting comparative work (27), connectivity
analysis revealed a significant couple between the MCC and PAG.
Recent animal work has also shown the optogenetic activation of
glutamatergic neurons in the dorsal lateral PAG induce motor
responses [e.g., flight (11)]. The MCC is also a critical component
of the defensive survival circuitry and has afferent projections to
the ventral striatum, receives efferent signals from the medial dorsal
thalamus, and has bidirectional projections with the amygdala (10).
It has also been suggested that control signals in the MCC may
resolve conflict between defensive strategies (e.g., freezing or flee-
ing). This has led to the theory that the cells in the MCC are in-
volved in linking motor centers with defensive circuits (10).
Our analysis for the slow-attacking threat contrast revealed
activation in three key areas of the cognitive fear circuitry in-
volved in more complex information processing—the vmPFC,
hippocampus, and PCC. Structural and function connectivity
between these structures has been shown in humans and pri-
mates, supporting conserved pathways across species (8). Pri-
mate research has found that the primate PCC responds to risky
decision making and scales with the degree of risk (28). The PCC
is also correlated with a salience signal reflecting the deviation
from the standard option, suggesting a role in the flexible allo-
cation of neural resources (29). A function of the PCC may be to
harvest information for escape decisions under conditions of
protracted threat. This fits with the proposal that, through its
connections with the hippocampus, the PCC may integrate
memory guided decisions with current decision processes that
may involve a “preparation for action” by anticipating and al-
tering behavioral policies (30).
Fig. 3. Visualization of Bayesian modeling results. (A) Estimated coefficients for each subject for the first scanning session, along with 95% confidence
intervals. The x axis represents the pain coefficient β1 in the utility function, and the y axis represents the monetary reward coefficient β2. For a rational player,
β2 should be positive (seeking money), and β1 should be negative (avoiding shock). (B) Model fit to observed FIDs for the first scanning session. The x axis
represents trial numbers, and the y axis represents FID. Ideal FID choices predicted by the ideal Bayesian observer (lines), subjects’ actual FID choice (dots).
Average values of reward preference and shock avoidance of the two scanning sessions were used as parametric modulators for the fMRI analysis. Data for
session 2 can be found in SI Appendix, Fig. S4.
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The vmPFC is also a key player in the defensive survival cir-
cuitry. Single-cell recordings in rodents have shown that the
mPFC contains “strategy-selective” cells, which are thought to be
involved in the coordination of defensive responses (21). This fits
with the idea that the mPFC plays a role in selecting adaptive
strategies that are mapped onto motor responses. Indeed, work
in humans shows that larger buffer distances are associated with
activity in the vmPFC, and decreased activity in these regions is
associated with panic-related motor actions (22, 23, 31). Our
data build on these findings by showing that the vmPFC, hip-
pocampus, and PCC form a strategic and flexible decision pro-
cess (17, 32), when the agent has time to contemplate the best
escape action. Our findings tentatively support the role of
complex cortical information processing circuits (i.e., cognitive
fear circuits) in “slower” escape decisions associated with flexible
and strategic avoidance through internal risk assessment that
involve model-based memory search (16, 33). This fits with a
model-based perspective where actions are deliberative and
employ a cognitive-style representation, which is an internal map
of events and stimuli from the external world, and take pro-
spective assessment of the consequences of an action (34). Thus,
the cortical activity observed here could represent “reflective
computations” associated with higher information processing
and cognitive architecture (30).
Our Bayesian model also provides insights into how the dis-
tinct regions of the survival circuits associated with optimal es-
cape. Two core regions were associated with optimal escape: the
MCC for the fast-attacking threat and the hippocampus for the
slow-attacking threat. While it is accepted that the PAG needs
input to make optimal decisions, it is unclear where this input
comes from. A few candidates exist; among them is the MCC.
The MCC is highly connected to the lateral PAG and according
to adaptive control theory is a “central hub” where information
about reinforcers are passed to motor control areas to co-
ordinate goal-directed behaviors (10). Our connectivity results
support this conclusion showing that the MCC was coupled with
activity in the PAG and the motor cortex. This proposes that the
MCC is one candidate region for the integration of current goals
and implement aversively motivated instrumental motor behav-
iors [i.e., when to flee a threat (10)].
Theorists have proposed that the hippocampus computes
comparators that assess multiple goals and in turn corrects ac-
tions (35) possibly through a flexible constructive process
involved in problem solving (36) and predictive mapping. When
there is time to gather information, the hippocampus may play a
role in drawing on previous threat encounters to form a pre-
dictive map and optimize current actions (37). The hippocampus
also plays a role in spatial and temporal “where” and “when”
memory and has theoretically been linked to escape decisions
(38) and may act to resolve conflict between fitness-promoting
behaviors (1, 3, 4, 39–42). Our computational analysis also
revealed a Bayesian role for the hippocampus, where it poten-
tially gathers information to optimize directed escape during
slow-attacking, but not fast-attacking, threat. Our connectivity
analysis did not reveal connections between these regions but did
show that the hippocampus was also coupled with activity in the
PCC, a region thought to be involved in adaptive decisions (30).
In summary, we introduce a paradigm that allows researchers to
map escape decisions onto the defensive survival circuitry. This
circuit can be separated into a fast reactive-fear circuit involved in
escape decision when time is limited and a slower cognitive-fear
circuit that is involved in more complex information processing
associated with the strategic avoidance and flexible escape deci-
sions. More specifically, sections of these circuits differentially
optimize escape decisions with the MCC centered on making fast
decisions associated with imminent threat and the hippocampus in
slow strategic decisions that are characterized by protracted threat
assessment. These results provide a window in the role of the
defensive survival circuitry in adaptive escape decisions and
transform the way we view the neural circuits involved in human
fear. Clearly, more work needs to be conducted to validate the
reactive and cognitive distinction of fear. Future interventions
using pharmacological agents and noninvasive methods (e.g.,
transcranial magnetic stimulation) could be used to examine more
causal functions of these fear circuits and how they manifest in
changes in computational strategies.
Methods
Participants. A total number of 30 subjects completed informed consent in
accordance with the guidelines of the Columbia University IRB and were
remunerated for their participation. Data from one subject were lost due to
computer error. One additional subject was excluded due to excessive
movement during the scan. Our final sample consisted of 28 subjects
(17 women; age, 25.4 ± 7.3 y).
Experiment Design. Subjects were scanned while they viewed stimuli on a
screen that displayed a 2D runway, with a virtual predator “attacking” from
Fig. 4. Regions, and their connectivity, associated
with parametric modulation of “distance to ideal.”
(A) Brain regions associated with increased Bayesian
decision optimality in the fast AD condition. Better
decision making was associated with increased ac-
tivity in MCC and superior motor cortex. (B) Brain
regions associated with decreased distance (increased
Bayesian decision optimality) in the slow AD condi-
tion activated regions include bilateral hippocampus
and bilateral caudate. A display of the correlation
results can be found in SI Appendix, Table S11. (C)
Connectivity analysis using MCC as seed over the
contrast [fast predator > control]. Positive connec-
tivity was found between MCC, motor cortex (MC),
thalamus, and the PAG. (D) Using the hippocampus
as seed over the contrast [slow predator > control],
positive connectivity was found between the hip-
pocampus and PCC.
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the left entrance. In the current paradigm, the goal of the subject was to
escape the attack from a certain virtual predator, by pressing a button at the
desired timing. Once the button was pressed, a triangle representing the
subject started moving toward a “safety exit.” Subjects gained reward if
they escaped to the safety before the predator caught them; on the other
hand, they were given a mildly aversive electric shock if they were caught.
The key was to choose the right timing to flee: acquire the maximum
amount of reward while still escaping the virtual predator. Reward in each
trial linearly scaled with time spent before pressing the button. The longer
subjects stayed in the starting position (the smaller the FID), the more re-
ward they got. However, if the subjects stayed for too long, they can get
caught, which would result in both a loss of all reward for the current trial
and the administration of an electric shock. However, they still maintain the
cumulative reward they received from previous trials.
The runway has a total length of 90 units, where the subject’s triangle is
placed 10 units to the safety exit. While in the approaching mode, the
predator oscillates toward the subject’s triangle at a speed of 4 units/s; while
in the chasing mode, the predator proceeds with a speed of 10 units/s. There
are 96 trials, factorially divided to cover different predator attack distances,
shock level, and reward levels [3 × 3 × 3; three types of predators; three
levels of shock (0, low, and high levels shock); and three levels of reward (0,
low, and high levels of reward)]. In the high-shock condition, subjects receive
two shocks instead of one. In addition, in the high-reward condition, sub-
jects receive twice the original reward if they escape. The control condition
was the zero-reward and zero-shock condition. Subjects were first presented
with a screen indicating which type of predator and shock/reward level will
be presented in the next trial for 2 s. This shock/reward indicator informs the
next four trials. Next, the trial begins, where subjects observe an artificial
predator slowly looming toward the triangle representing themselves. After
a designated time period, which is learned by the participant, the artificial
predator will attack by speeding up when it reaches the attacking position.
To make sure reaction time plays no role in FIDs, we manipulated the speed
of the predator and the subject so that, once the threat speeds up to attack,
it is impossible to escape after that time point. After the trial, subjects are
required to rate the difficulty of escape using a visual analog (1–5) scale.
After the first 48 trials, the assignment of predator–color relationship was
altered to introduce novelty and avoid the (habitual) fixation of subject
strategies. Same colors were reassigned among the predators (e.g., the
original fast-attacking predator changes color from blue to red).
Before the start of the actual experiment, subjects went through a brief
practice session of eight trials to familiarize themselves with the paradigm. In the
practice session, subjects played the same game, but the predators’ attack dis-
tances were drawn from different distributions other than the ones used in the
actual experiment. The level of the electric shock was calibrated according to
subjects’ level of tolerance (self-reported to be aversive, yet not painful). With a
1–10 scale, the average calibrated shock level was 6.4 (mean, 6.4; SD, 1.3).
Behavioral Analysis. Due to the relative simplicity of our task and exposure to
a practice session, subjects’ performance reached saturation very quickly
after the beginning of the experiment. By “saturation,” subjects quickly
formed their own patterns of choice making and carry through the rest of
the experiment. Thus, instead of looking at trial-by-trial changes of the FID,
we focus on the differences of FID between different predator conditi-
ons, and approaches subjects’ learning behavior by a Bayesian decision-
making model.
Subjects’ choice of FID, reward from the trial, and escapability ratings were
collected on each trial. We used repeated-measures three-way ANOVAs (of
predator type by reward level by shock level) to assess differences in FID, re-
ward, and escapability ratings between the various conditions.
The analysis of fMRI data and Bayesian decision-making model can be
found in SI Appendix, SI Text.
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